The Republic of Ghana stands at a critical constitutional precipice where the sanctity of institutional permanence is being sacrificed on the altar of individual indispensability.
This administrative landscape presents a serious legal and socio-political issue. While the 1992 Constitution provides an explicit framework for the tenure and retirement of public officers, we are witnessing an increasing trend toward what may be described as the “personalization of the temporary.” This phenomenon is characterized by a systemic failure to ensure institutional continuity, manifest in the absence of essential handover protocols and the controversial extension of tenures beyond mandatory retirement ages.
This crisis of transition is evident across the highest echelons of the state. The Rt. Hon. Speaker of Parliament, Alban Bagbin, publicly noted upon assuming office that the absence of comprehensive handover notes from his predecessor significantly impeded his ability to grasp ongoing projects and the administrative state of the Parliamentary Service. Similar challenges have been observed within the Ghana Education Service (GES), where incoming Directors-General have frequently inherited a vacuum of documentation, stifling the momentum of educational programs. This lack of institutional memory extends to various Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs), leading to protracted delays in project implementation and the loss of policy rationale. Even within Academia and Local Government, the transition of Vice-Chancellors, Registrars, and District Executives is often marred by inadequate handover processes, compromising financial commitments and administrative stability.
The Tenure Extension Phenomenon and the “Messiah Myth”
The most visible manifestation of this puzzle is the recent trend of extending the tenures of high-ranking officials, such as the current Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Mr. Christian Tetteh Yohuno, after they have attained the mandatory retirement age of sixty. While the professional competence and “marvelous works” of the current IGP-ranging from enhanced discipline to tactical successes- are noteworthy, the legal and systemic implications of such extensions are significant.
Under Article 202(1) of the 1992 Constitution, the power to appoint the IGP vests in the President. However, as a constituent of the Public Services under Article 190(1)(a), the IGP is subject to the compulsory retirement provisions of Article 199(1). When the State routinely grants extensions, it inadvertently cultivates a “Messiah Myth.” This narrative implies that the Ghana Police Service, an institution established under Article 200, is so structurally deficient that it cannot produce a single qualified successor from its senior officer corps. This paradox is replicated at the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) and other vital state agencies.
Such extensions signal a lack of confidence in the Public Services Commission’s mandate to manage human resource pipelines under Article 196. By centering the office on the individual rather than the position, a constitutional role is transformed into a personal fiefdom. This practice effectively obstructs the career progression of Deputy and Assistant Commissioners, who hold a “legitimate expectation” of advancement.
Beyond the already stated, it forces successors to “reinvent the wheel” at a massive financial cost through redundant project restarts. This “administrative amnesia” treats public knowledge as personal property, facilitating potential corruption and opaque transitions.
Without a mandated culture of grooming successors, the state remains perpetually vulnerable to leadership vacuums, ensuring that every transition becomes a crisis of continuity rather than a seamless transfer of stewardship
The Socio-Political Impediments to Succession Planning
The reluctance to implement viable succession plans is rooted in several deep-seated socio-political factors:
- The Fear of Social Obscurity: In the Ghanaian socio-cultural context, titles are often synonymous with identity. Leaders may perceive the preparation of a successor as a concession of their own relevance, fearing a descent into social obscurity post-tenure.
- The “Opaque Ledger” Syndrome: When administration is personalized, operational methods often deviate from standardized regulations. There is a palpable fear that an independent successor may uncover “administrative shortcuts” or informal patronage networks established to maintain functionality.
- The Patronage Trap: High-level appointments are frequently influenced by political loyalty rather than objective merit. A formalized, merit-based succession plan threatens the political patronage systems that often govern top-tier recruitment.
- The Primacy of Seniority over Innovation: A cultural inclination to value chronological age over innovative capacity often leads boards to view a 61-year-old as a “stable” choice, while viewing younger, qualified candidates as an inherent “risk.”
- Technological Obsolescence and Ego: There is a psychological resistance among some older leaders toward younger, tech-savvy subordinates whose efficiency might render the predecessor’s career-long methods appear antiquated.
- Information Asymmetry as a Survival Strategy: In a volatile political environment, leaders may utilize “information hoarding” to ensure they remain indispensable, effectively making themselves “un-fireable” by being the sole custodians of critical institutional secrets.
The Legal Tightrope: “Exigencies” vs. Excellence
The legal framework for retirement was modified by the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 527). While Article 199(1) maintains the compulsory retirement age at sixty, Section 6 of Act 527 inserted Clause (4), which allows for a post-retirement contract not exceeding five years in total, provided the “exigencies of the service” so require.
The Supreme Court, in Yovuyibor v. Attorney-General and Bawuah v. Attorney-General, affirmed that the retirement age for police officers is sixty. However, the “exigency” provision is increasingly utilized as a default administrative tool rather than a rare exception. In Bimpong-Buta v. General Legal Council, the Court noted that the application of Article 199 is a matter of clear law and arithmetic. If a leader fails to cultivate a successor, the resulting “urgent need” is a self-created exigency. Jurisprudentially, a self-created exigency should not justify a constitutional extension. Utilizing Act 527 to retain heads of MDAs is an implicit admission of a breach of fiduciary duty- the obligation to ensure the institution is resilient enough to survive the departure of any single individual.
A Strategic Framework for Institutional Stewardship
To rectify these systemic failures, a shift toward institutional stewardship is required through the following reforms:
- An 18-Month Transition Statute:
The Civil Service Act and Public Service Regulations should be amended to mandate that every head of a public institution file a “Succession and Transition Report” eighteen months prior to retirement. This report must identify potential internal successors; failure to comply should result in the forfeiture of end-of-service benefits. - Mandatory Shadowing Protocols: During the final six months of a leader’s tenure, a designated successor should undergo a formal “shadowing” period with full access to institutional records to ensure a seamless transfer of responsibility.
- Digital Institutional Memory: Transitioning from “tacit knowledge” to “explicit digital records” is essential. Secure, centralized digital systems must document all policy rationales and project statuses, ensuring the office- not the individual- owns the information.
- A Mentorship Consultative Role: Instead of granting executive extensions, retired leaders should be transitioned into short-term advisory roles as “Consultants to the Successor,” stripped of executive authority but available for institutional guidance.
- A Succession Audit: The Public Services Commission should be legally empowered to conduct “succession audits.” Any institution head who fails to maintain a robust pool of successors should be legally barred from post-retirement contracts. Furthermore, “exigency” must be legally defined to exclude vacancies created by a failure to plan.
Conclusion
A leader’s true legacy is not defined by their actions while in office, but by the functionality and resilience of the institution after their departure. Ghana must transition from the era of “Indispensable Men” to the era of “Indestructible Systems.” Only by codifying these transitions can we satisfy the legitimate expectations of the next generation and ensure the stability of the Republic.
Signed,
Frank Quaye
LegalActivist
Email: frankquaye62@gmail.com
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