Techniques used to recruit and co-opt African nationals into fighting in the Russian-Ukrainian war

Thousands of African nationals have been drawn into Russia’s war in Ukraine, often through a calculated pipeline of deception and exploitation.

Although definitive statistics are unavailable, informed estimates suggest as many as 4,000 Africans are involved, according to a February 2026 analysis by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). This represents the largest involvement of Africans in an international war since the French Indochina War in Vietnam in the 1950s.

African civic society and media analysis of the phenomena has, however, been fragmented and largely anecdotal. African regulators and other authorities have also been slow to quantify or respond to the growing mobilisation.

This African Digital Democracy Observatory (ADDO) resource-kit seeks therefore to support a more analytical approach by providing a consolidated summary of publicly verified factual evidence that spotlights the specific methods, channels, and coercive tactics used to enlist or trick African citizens into fighting in the war.

The resource kit includes a fact sheet overview of the most notable trends or insights, a consolidated summary of credible publicly reported evidence, and a database of Africans named as war recruits or casualties. ADDO will update the resource kit on a regular basis and offer support for African researchers investigating the issue.

Statistical Overview

Scale and Risk:

• Total identified fighters: At least 1,436 people from 36 countries in Africa have been identified by Ukrainian authorities as frontline fighters for Russia, with one independent French researcher suggesting that as many as 3,000–4,000 Africans in total are fighting alongside the 18,000–20,000 foreign fighters in the Russian military. Those estimates are likely to change significantly, after Kenyan intelligence agencies told parliament in late February that over 1,000 Kenyans have been recruited to fight for Russia. There are no current public estimates for Africans fighting for Ukraine, but in 2022 Russia said they had identified 249 Africans in Ukrainian uniform.
• High mortality: 42% of foreign fighters die within four months of service in the Russian army, based on data supplied by Ukrainian authorities.
• Confirmed casualties: Reports estimate that approximately 150 Cameroonians, 50 Burkinabe and 25 Egyptians have died.
• Verified cases: Propaganda is everywhere. Code for Africa (CfA) has therefore begun independently verifying cases, and has confirmed 60 cases across 16 African countries, with 42% (25 individuals) confirmed deaths, 15 being prisoners of war, 9 returnees, and 4 being incommunicado. This excludes the new Kenyan intelligence estimates, which don’t include itemised evidence or data.

Primary recruitment and enticement strategies:

• Commission-based agents: A ‘layered ecosystem’ of Russo‑African networks is recruiting fighters. Freelance African diaspora fixers in Moscow work with local travel agencies (for example Fly Away Travel & Tour in Ghana and St. Fortunes Travels and Logistics in Nigeria), assisted by Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) across West Africa and the Sahel (especially militias in CAR and Burkina Faso), alongside Russian embassy-supported affinity groups and African non-state armed groups, to quietly recruit and transport men, often under misleading ‘security’ job offers on tourist visas that researchers believe amount to human‑trafficking chains abetted by corrupt officials at borders.
• For factory workers, recruiters target 18- to 22‑year‑old women with secondary education by promising hospitality/automotive jobs, but placing them in drone assembly. This recruitment is far more public and institutional, running directly through Russian embassies (for example, in Côte d’Ivoire, the Russian embassy openly advertises Alabuga Start on its website), African education ministries, universities, businesspeople (some African businesswomen have signed MOUs to deliver thousands of workers, later claiming they themselves were ‘manipulated’), BRICS‑linked women’s and youth organisations and pro‑Russia civil society groups that market the scheme as scholarships and career opportunities.
• Financial exploitation: Recruiters explicitly target candidate groups that face severe economic hardship, with IFRI researchers noting most fighters are low‑income urban civilians (including teachers, junior civil servants and students) with no prior military experience, and an ideologically motivated minority who see themselves as fighting Western domination via Russia.
• Incentives: Agents advertise high financial rewards, including salaries up to $3,500 and sign-on bonuses as high as $13,000.
• Deceptive promises: Many victims were initially lured with promises of lucrative civilian jobs or non-combat roles.
• False roles: Commonly presented positions included security guard, factory worker, driver, or artisanal roles.
• False legitimacy: High-profile agents, many based in the diáspora or formerly associated with African political or military structures, are sometimes used to manipulate victims and create a false impression of legitimacy.

Recruitment channels and intermediaries:

• Social media campaign surge: The use of social media platforms (VKontakte, Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, X) grew dramatically, with posts promoting military service to foreigners on VKontakte alone rising from 621 to 4,600 between June and September 2025.
• Agent networks: Recruitment is largely conducted through agents and influencers who receive payment for each secured hire. Key players, like Polina Alexandrovna Azarnykh (known as ‘Friend of Russia’), use Telegram to target men in Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria.
• Extortion by agents: In addition to commissions, victims are also charged fees, with some agents taking a substantial cut of the promised bonuses, such as one agent who received over $25,000 from the signing bonuses of 14 trafficked Ghanaians.
• Gaming platforms: Agents have used military simulation video games, such as Arma 3, to successfully recruit players.
• Citizenship as incentive: African recruits are enticed with promises of Russian citizenship after service. Although no Africa-specific statistics are available, more than 3,300 foreign fighters were reportedly granted Russian citizenship between January and November 2024.

Coercion and non-voluntary enrolment:

• Recruitment from prisons: Convicted individuals, often students jailed for drug trafficking (like Zambian citizen Lemekani Nathan Nyirenda), were recruited directly from Russian prisons in exchange for a pardon or shortened sentence.
• Visa threats and deportation: Russian officials reportedly threatened not to extend the visas of African students and workers unless they enlisted, forcing some to choose between fighting and deportation.
• Deceptive contracting: Once recruited, individuals are forced to sign Russian-language contracts for 9–12 months, often without an interpreter or lawyer present (sometimes at a police station), agreeing to terms different from what agents originally proposed.
• Propaganda: Russian media promotes military service with glowing reports from volunteers, offers of rewards and service awards like the medal for courage. It also promotes stories of undocumented immigrants who were offered military service as an opportunity to stay in Russia instead of deportation.

Maltreatment and service conditions:

• Passport confiscation: After signing contracts, African fighters report that their passports are seized for ‘safekeeping’ making it impossible for them to leave the country.
• Deployment as ‘cannon fodder’: Recruits receive minimal combat training, sometimes less than two weeks, before being deployed to high-intensity frontlines such as Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia as ‘cannon fodder’ or ‘disposables’, while Russian soldiers are kept behind.
• Racial abuse: African fighters report being subjected to racial abuse from commanders, who called them ‘used condoms’ and other unsavoury names.
• Harsh conditions: Survivors reported severe conditions, including lack of water and food for up to five days, bodies left to decompose, and instances of being robbed by agents or other Russian soldiers, with promised compensation for casualties not reaching families.

African government responses:

• Botswana: The government has not spoken out on recruitment of fighters, but has reacted to public concern about Alabuga Start by opening investigations. Interpol has been involved in probing potential trafficking aspects of the programme. ​Some Botswana influencers who initially promoted Alabuga jobs have since distanced themselves.
• Cameroon: IFRI notes an estimated 150 active service soldiers deserting from the Cameroonian military to Russia, prompting Yaoundé to issue internal orders to restrict foreign travel and training for lower ranks. The measure reframes recruitment as an internal cohesion threat rather than a human rights issue.
• Egypt: The government announced it would revoke the nationality of any citizen who fights for Russia and has imposed a security clearance requirement for citizens travelling to Russia. Authorities have also warned that serving in any foreign military can result in a life prison sentence upon return to Egypt.
• Kenya: Kenya’s National Intelligence Service told parliament on 20 February 2026 that more than 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight on behalf of Russia, a significant increase on the 200 fighter estimate given by Kenya’s foreign affairs ministry in November. The reports said Kenyans had been lured by “rogue recruitment agencies”, with many cases qualifying as human trafficking scams. Authorities have opened investigations and arrested intermediaries as they tried to move a new group to Russia, and widely publicised these cases to warn citizens. Nairobi has also engaged Moscow diplomatically on repatriating fighters and the bodies of those killed.
• Nigeria: The ministry of foreign affairs issued a public statement on 15 February 2026 warning about growing illegal recruitment of Nigerian citizens into foreign armed conflicts, without naming any specific country, but noting that citizens are being lured under false pretences and are being deployed into combat zones after being coerced into signing military service contracts. The government stressed that recruitment violates Nigerian and international laws governing mercenary activities, and that Nigerians who participate in foreign conflicts outside approved governmental frameworks do so at their own risk.
• South Africa: A political scandal erupted when 17 South Africans serving with Russian forces appealed for help to return, saying they had been sent for ‘bodyguard training’ by the opposition MK Party founded by former president Jacob Zuma. ​Police have opened investigations into possible mercenary activity, while Zuma’s daughter, Duduzile Sambudla-Zuma, faces potential legal action as she has been accused of tricking the men into going. South Africa’s current president, Cyril Ramaphosa, announced in February that Russia has agreed to repatriate the 17 fighters. South African authorities have meanwhile also launched investigations into Alabuga Start, with government departments issuing public warnings about Russian job offers, and influencers who promoted the scheme walking back or apologising for their initial support of it.

ADDO researchers have formally asked the ministries of defence of both Russia and Ukraine to confirm the number of African citizens currently fighting on their behalf, as well as asking for clarity on the number of Africans injured, killed or captured during the conflict. No response had been received at the time this fact sheet was published. The fact sheet will be updated if/when there is a response from either party.

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