Ladies and gentlemen of the media, distinguished leaders of civil society, development partners, representatives and fellow citizens committed to accountable governance — good morning. We gather here today not for partisan contestation, nor for institutional rivalry, but for the defence of something far greater: the constitutional architecture of decentralisation, the integrity of public finance, and the supremacy of parliamentary authority in the Republic of Ghana.
At the centre of our concern are the 2025 Guidelines for the Utilisation of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), issued by the Ministry of Local Government and approved by Cabinet. Upon careful review, these Guidelines contain fundamental inconsistencies, clear legal breaches, and deep contradictions with the 2025 District Assemblies Common Fund Formula duly approved by Parliament.
Let us be unequivocal. This is not a technical quarrel. This is not an administrative oversight. This is not a routine policy disagreement. For us, as the Minority Caucus and many discerning Ghanaians, this is a constitutional issue. This is a governance issue, and, by extension, a democratic accountability issue.
Why We Are Speaking Out
Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution is clear and unambiguous. It vests in Parliament — and Parliament alone — the authority to determine the formula for the sharing of the District Assemblies Common Fund across our 261 MMDAs.
That authority is neither symbolic nor advisory. It is binding. In accordance with this mandate, Parliament approved the 2025 DACF Formula, allocating GHS 7.51 billion for the fiscal year and distributing it based on a scientifically grounded, equity-driven model.
Nonetheless, the 2025 Ministerial Guidelines introduce, in effect, a parallel allocation regime — one that imposes new mandatory percentages, new expenditure categories, and new national priorities that do not exist in the Parliamentary Formula.
In doing so, the Executive has stepped beyond guidance into redesign – and that, by every standard of constitutional law, is ultra vires.
The Central Conflict
The Parliamentary Formula is not arbitrary. It is not political. It is not improvised.
It is data-driven and empirically structured. It is built upon:
- Location Quotients (LQ),
- Need factors including health facilities, educational infrastructure, water coverage, and road networks,
- Equality components,
- Service pressure indicators,
- Weighted allocations under Scenario B: 40% Equality, 56% Needs, 4% Service Pressure (2025 Formula, p.18)
This design ensures that districts with greater deprivation receive proportionately greater support. It is the very essence of equitable development.
In contrast, the Ministerial Guidelines mandate fixed national percentages:
- 25% for 24-hour economy markets,
- 10% for CHPS compounds,
- 10% for school blocks,
- 10% for boreholes,
- 10% for sanitation,
- 5% for administration,
- 20% for legacy projects.
These percentages appear nowhere — absolutely nowhere — in the Parliamentary Formula. In fact they are not supplementary. They are not interpretative. They are substitutive.
The Legal Breach
Section 126(1) of the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) permits a Minister to issue utilisation guidelines — but only to facilitate implementation within the parameters of the approved formula.
The law does not empower the Minister to:
- Assign new national percentages,
- Redesign allocation structures,
- Override Parliamentary weighting mechanisms,
- Create a parallel formula.
The 2025 Guidelines exceed administrative authority and encroach upon constitutional power reserved exclusively for Parliament. This is a textbook case of ultra vires executive action. It undermines Article 252. It weakens Act 936. It distorts decentralised governance and it threatens the financial autonomy of our MMDAs.
Why This Matters for Every District
This is not an abstract constitutional debate. It has tangible consequences for real communities.
1. Equity Is Undermined
The Parliamentary Formula directs more resources to districts with greater developmental deficits. Fixed ministerial percentages erase these distinctions. A deprived rural district and a relatively resourced urban district are forced into identical expenditure templates, regardless of need. Equity is replaced by uniformity. Justice is replaced by rigidity.
2. Local Autonomy Is Eroded
Decentralisation exists to empower local planning through approved Medium-Term Development Plans. The Guidelines impose a top-down structure that constrains Assemblies and reduces them to implementers of centrally prescribed projects.
3. Governance Roles Are Blurred
The expanded approval roles assigned to Members of Parliament under the Reserve Fund provisions risk distorting constitutionally defined responsibilities. MPs are legislators and oversight agents — not executive managers of district expenditure.
4. Administrative Confusion Is Created
MMDAs now face two contradictory authorities:
- The legally binding Parliamentary Formula,
- The administratively forceful but legally questionable Guidelines.
This creates uncertainty, delays procurement, disrupts budgeting cycles, and exposes public officers to legal risk.
Our Democratic Responsibility
We speak not in opposition to development priorities. We speak in defence of constitutional order. When executive authority exceeds its lawful boundary, silence becomes complicity. The strength of our democracy lies not in the absence of disagreement, but in the courage to correct constitutional deviation. The rule of law must not bend to administrative convenience. Parliamentary supremacy in public finance is not optional. It is foundational.
Our Call to Action as Minority Caucus of the 9th Parliament
We respectfully call for:
- Immediate Withdrawal or Revision of the 2025 DACF Guidelines
They must be aligned strictly with the Parliamentary Formula. - Parliament to Reassert Its Constitutional Authority
Article 252 cannot be diluted by administrative circulars. - The DACF Administrator to Implement Only the Approved Formula
Section 125 of Act 936 is clear: the Administrator must act within lawful parameters. - MMDAs to Adhere to the Parliamentary Formula in Budgeting
Assemblies must not be compelled into unconstitutional expenditure patterns. - Sustained Civil Society and Media Oversight
Transparency is the oxygen of decentralisation.
Section II
DACF Capping and Arrears: The Law, The Breaches, and the Fallout
Having addressed the constitutional concerns surrounding the 2025 DACF Guidelines, As Minority Caucus, we now wish to move to another matter of equal gravity — one that goes to the very financial sustainability of our local governance system.
This concerns DACF capping and the persistent arrears owed to our Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. The strength of decentralisation does not rest only on lawful allocation formulas; it rests on timely, full, and predictable disbursement of funds. When the Common Fund is capped, withheld, or delayed, development stalls, contractors go unpaid, and communities suffer.
It is therefore imperative that we examine not only how the Fund is structured, but whether it is being released in accordance with constitutional and statutory obligations.
- No capping: the Constitution and Supreme Court are unequivocal.
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution sets a bright‑line rule in Article 252(2): “not less than five percent (5%) of the total revenue of Ghana” must be allocated to the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). This allocation is neither advisory nor subject to ministerial discretion; it is a binding constitutional command that anchors fiscal decentralisation and shields local development financing from arbitrary central interference. The Supreme Court cemented this position in Benjamin Komla Kpodo & Richard Quashigah v. Attorney‑General (12 June 2019), declaring that neither Parliament nor the Minister for Finance may allocate less than 5% of total revenue to the DACF and striking down legal provisions that had the effect of limiting the DACF to a smaller base or capping it below the constitutional minimum.
- The 5% rule is a constitutional floor—not a negotiable target.
Article 252(2) was designed as a floor to guarantee predictable resources for districts; any downward adjustment violates the Constitution’s text and spirit. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kpodo & Quashigah reinforces that the DACF must be calculated on total national revenue, not a narrower definition, and cannot be reduced by capping statutes or administrative practices. In short, compliance is mandatory; non‑payment or underpayment is unconstitutional.
- Persistent non‑compliance: ABFA transfers have fallen far below the 5% threshold.
Despite the Court’s clarity, the Ministry of Finance’s transfers to the DACF from the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) have, in recent years, consistently fallen short. The Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) reported that only 1.74% of ABFA was transferred in 2021 and 2.39% in 2022, far below the constitutionally mandated minimum—illustrating a continuing pattern of under‑allocation to the DACF against explicit constitutional and judicial direction. This pattern substantiates your observation that by 2025 transfers hovered around 1%—an outcome that remains fundamentally at odds with Article 252(2) and the Supreme Court’s 2019 ruling.
- The “arrears trap”: payments in 2024 were largely for old debts (2014–2016), not current compliance.
It is important to note that when the NPP-led government announced disbursements in 2024, significant portions were not in compliance with the 5% rule; they were payments against legacy arrears dating back to 2014, 2015, and 2016.
It is imperative to note that when the NDC exited government, significant arrears covering 2014, 2015, and 2016 remained unpaid. Those were not minor accounting gaps; they were constitutional obligations owed to Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. The failure to settle them reflected not only fiscal choices but priorities. The Assemblies — the engines of local development — were left waiting.
When the NPP led goverment assumed office in 2017, it did not dismiss those arrears as someone else’s problem. It confronted them. Between 2017 and 2021 — and even extending into 2024 — payments were made toward clearing those legacy debts. That demonstrated a clear policy position: district development cannot be postponed because of inherited liabilities. The Assemblies needed their funds, and the NPP government acted to restore that flow.
Today, however, despite being in office for a year, the NDC administration has not made any payments toward these constitutional obligations and appears hesitant to address the remaining commitment and the historical precedent, which sends a troubling signal. The District Assembly Common Fund is not discretionary generosity; it is a constitutional entitlement. Delayed payments undermine projects, stall contractors, and weaken local governance.
The record speaks for itself. One government (NPP-led government) inherited arrears and steadily paid them down. The current government (NDC-led) inherited a stabilised framework and has slowed the momentum.
If commitment is measured by action, then the evidence shows that the administration that prioritised clearing arrears and ensuring that Assemblies received what the law guarantees them.
The District Assemblies deserve consistency. They deserve certainty. And above all, they deserve governments that treat constitutional obligations not as options, but as duties. Furthermore, the arrears accumulated under the NDC government — covering unpaid DACF obligations in 2024 alone total approximately GHS 7.33 billion. That figure represents constitutional funds owed to District Assemblies but not paid. It reflects delayed development, stalled infrastructure, and communities waiting for projects that should have been delivered years ago. The unpaid arrears are not a small administrative oversight. It is a significant fiscal backlog. And it speaks directly to priorities — to what was funded, and what was left behind.
- A troubling contrast: GETFund and NHIA received large 2025 releases while DACF obligations lagged.
It is imperative to note, that in early 2025, the GETFund received GH¢2.71 billion (covering January–April 2025), and the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) received GH¢2.03 billion for Q1 2025, according to official statements in Parliament and corroborating media. The NHIA further announced in April 2025 that it had cleared GH¢834 million in provider arrears—an affirmation of robust transfers to the health insurance scheme during that period. By contrast, the DACF continued to suffer long‑running arrears and under‑transfers relative to its constitutional status, despite also receiving a Q1 2025 transfer (about GH¢987.97 million) that did not, in itself, extinguish the historical backlog.
6. Real‑world consequences are evident in stalled projects, unpaid contractors, and a weakening of decentralisation.
Since DACF is the principal lifeline for district‑level infrastructure and social investments, chronic under‑allocation and arrears have concrete developmental costs: district assemblies struggle to mobilise contractors, projects stall or are abandoned, and citizens are denied timely services and local economic opportunities. Parliamentary records and civil society commentary have repeatedly warned that starving the DACF undermines the Medium‑Term Development Plans (MTDPs) of MMDAs and erodes the very decentralisation Ghana’s Constitution set out to entrench. The paradox is glaring: while statutory funds like GETFund and NHIA received significant releases in early 2025, the constitutionally guaranteed DACF continued to carry a heavy arrears burden—an inversion of the hierarchy the Constitution intended.
Our Call to Pragmatic action as Minority Caucus of the 9th Parliament
1. Immediate Constitutional Compliance Mechanism
(a) Automatic Revenue-Based Computation Formula
Parliament must legislate or operationalise a binding fiscal formula that:
- Calculates DACF strictly as not less than 5% of total national revenue, not a subset.
- Embeds the computation directly into the national budget framework.
- Makes the allocation automatic upon revenue inflow.
This can be achieved through:
- An amendment to the Public Financial Management (PFM) Act to create a statutory “first-line charge” mechanism.
- Mandatory quarterly publication of revenue inflows and corresponding DACF accruals.
The principle is simple: if GETFund and NHIA can receive structured, predictable releases, so must DACF — especially given its constitutional supremacy.
2. Arrears Resolution Framework (Structured Liquidation Plan)
The estimated GH¢7+billion arrears cannot be cleared rhetorically; they require a structured settlement plan.
Proposed Framework:
- Independent Arrears Audit
- Commission the Auditor-General to verify and reconcile DACF arrears from 2014 to date.
- Publish a certified arrears stock.
- Medium-Term Arrears Amortisation Plan
- Spread repayment across 3–5 fiscal years.
- Ring-fence a fixed percentage of annual revenue growth specifically for arrears clearance.
- Disallow the reclassification of arrears payments as current-year compliance.
- Legal Prohibition Against Rolling Arrears
- Introduce a statutory clause preventing arrears accumulation beyond a single fiscal year.
- Mandate personal accountability of public officers for deliberate under-transfer.
This approach mirrors structured debt resolution principles applied in sovereign fiscal adjustments.
3. Parliamentary Oversight Strengthening
Parliament must move from passive receipt of reports to active enforcement.
Key Measures:
- Established relevant committees should maintain and extend enhanced oversight duties under the Finance Committee.
- Require quarterly reporting by the Minister for Finance on:
- Total revenue collected
- 5% DACF computation
- Actual transfers
- Outstanding balances
Non-compliance should trigger:
- Formal parliamentary sanctions
- Referral to the Attorney-General for constitutional enforcement
- Possible invocation of Article 2 enforcement proceedings
Oversight must have consequences.
4. Constitutional Litigation Safeguard
Where administrative compliance fails, constitutional enforcement must follow.
Civil society, district assemblies, or affected parties retain the right under Article 2(1) of the Constitution to seek enforcement before the Supreme Court.
However, repeated litigation is not the ideal solution. Therefore:
- Parliament should codify Supreme Court compliance requirements directly into statutory fiscal procedures to prevent recurring violations.
5. Administrative Reforms within the Ministry of Finance
Administrative bottlenecks and fiscal prioritisation distortions must be corrected.
Practical Steps:
- Create a Dedicated DACF Transfer Desk within the Treasury to ensure monthly accrual tracking.
- Integrate DACF computations into the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS) for real-time visibility.
- Prevent discretionary “sequencing” of DACF after other statutory funds.
Constitutional hierarchy must determine fiscal sequencing — not administrative preference.
6. Transparency and Public Accountability
Public knowledge strengthens constitutional compliance.
- Publish a DACF Compliance Dashboard online.
- Disclose monthly revenue inflows versus DACF transfers.
- Allow District Assemblies to publicly report delayed disbursements.
Sunlight is a constitutional disinfectant.
7. Strengthening Decentralisation Through Fiscal Discipline
Underfunding DACF undermines:
- Medium-Term Development Plans (MTDPs)
- Contractor confidence
- Local economic stimulation
- Infrastructure continuity
- Democratic decentralisation
The Constitution envisioned DACF as the backbone of local development. Chronic under-transfer erodes the architecture of decentralisation and weakens local governance legitimacy.
8. Harmonising Constitutional Funds Without Distortion
The contrast between timely releases to GETFund and NHIA and persistent DACF arrears raises structural prioritisation concerns.
The corrective principle should be:
Constitutional funds must be honoured in accordance with their legal hierarchy, not political expediency.
DACF is constitutionally entrenched. That status demands at least equal, if not greater, fiscal discipline compared to statutory funds.
9. Long-Term Structural Safeguard: Constitutional Entrenchment of Automaticity
A forward-looking reform could involve:
- Amending the Constitution or clarifying through Supreme Court interpretation that DACF accrual is an automatic deduction at source — similar to how some countries treat subnational allocations.
This would eliminate discretionary delay entirely.
Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen, as we bring this solemn engagement to a close, let us remind ourselves that the issue before us today is far bigger than guidelines, formulas, or percentages. It is about the soul of our constitutional democracy. It is about whether the foundational principles that hold this Republic together can withstand the quiet erosion of executive overreach, administrative shortcuts, and disregard for lawful financial governance.
We stand here because the District Assemblies Common Fund is not merely another line item in the national budget. It is the constitutional heartbeat of decentralised development—a covenant between the State and the people of Ghana that no community, no district, and no citizen should be left behind. It is the fund through which our Constitution breathes life into equity, fairness, and balanced development. Furthermore, when this Fund is distorted, constrained, capped, or redirected outside the lawful authority of Parliament, it is not only the Assemblies that suffer. Our democracy suffers; our decentralization suffers. Our social contract suffers.
What we have exposed today is not a minor administrative lapse; it is a systemic infraction, aconstitutional deviation, and adirect affront to Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. It is an attempt to substitute Parliament’s carefully developed, data-driven allocation model with a parallel directive that Parliament neither debated nor approved. It is, at its core, a breach of the sacred limits of executive power and a reversal of years of progress in decentralised governance.
Let this be clear: We are not opposed to development. We are opposed to illegality. We are opposed to unconstitutionality. We are opposed to actions that weaken our Republic.
We speak today because silence would be betrayal—betrayal of the Constitution, betrayal of the Assemblies whose projects are stalled, betrayal of contractors who remain unpaid, and betrayal of citizens whose development needs remain unmet while billions in DACF arrears stand outstanding.
We cannot be silent when the Supreme Court—as in the celebrated case of Benjamin Komla Kpodo & Richard Quashigah v. Attorney-General—has already pronounced that DACF allocations cannot be capped and must never fall below 5% of total national revenue, a ruling that government continues to ignore with ABFA transfers as low as 1.74% and 2.39% in recent years.
We cannot be silent when arrears for 2024 alone estimated at over GH¢7 billion, continue to cripple local development and weaken basic service delivery across the nation. We cannot be silent when GETFund and NHIA receive their statutory payments—over GH¢2.7 billion and GH¢2.03 billion respectively in early 2025—while the constitutionally mandated DACF continues to be starved.
And we will not be silent.
Today, we reaffirm a simple truth: Constitutions do not enforce themselves. Citizens do. Leaders do. Parliaments do. And when necessary, minorities do. We stand today not as adversaries of government, but as custodians of constitutional governance.
Our duty is clear:
To insist on fidelity to the law.
To hold power accountable.
To protect the integrity of decentralization and defend the right of every district—from Zabzugu to Jomoro, from Dormaa to Keta—to receive the resources that the Constitution has guaranteed them.
We will continue to shine light where opacity persists, to challenge illegality wherever it manifests, and to hold firm the line that separates lawful governance from administrative excess. Let us go forward, strengthened by conviction, united in purpose, and anchored in the principles of justice, accountability, and constitutional supremacy. Let us go forward knowing that when Parliament stands, democracy stands—and when Parliament’s authority is undermined, every Ghanaian feels the tremor.
May our resolve strengthen this great Republic. May our actions defend her democratic soul. Finally, may we always remember that the Constitution we swore to uphold is not a suggestion—it is the supreme expression of the will of the Ghanaian people.
Thank you.
God bless you.
And God bless the Republic of Ghana.
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