Thirty-Three years of uninterrupted multiparty democracy represent a unique period in Ghana’s post-independence political trajectory, as I have regularly argued, because of our previously failed attempts (1969-72, 1979-81).
An important development during this period has been the advent of the Afrobarometer survey, which has been capturing the lived experiences of not just Ghanaians but also other African countries since 1999 on matters of democracy and governance.
Ghana’s participation in the survey spans 10 rounds (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022, and 2024) and provides a rich accumulation of data that allows us to explore how a nation, with a non-democratic past, feels about its democratic experiences.
In this piece, I focus on some noticeable shifts (declines) in our democratic attitudes over time.
I choose this focus because they are the kinds of shifts that have the potential to undermine the foundations of our democracy on the road to consolidation.
Selected highlightsof key shifts
First, and the most noticeable shift, is citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy.
Between the maiden edition of the survey (1999) and the fourth round (2008), the percentage of citizens who indicated being dissatisfied with the way “democracy works in Ghana” declined from 32% to 16%.
However, the percentage of citizens dissatisfied with the way “democracy works in Ghana” has significantly increased since then to 50% (Round 10, 2024).
This is a very worrying shift when these many people are dissatisfied with democracy.
Second, when asked about the extent of democracy in Ghana, there was a significant improvement in the number of Ghanaians describing the country as a “full democracy” from 23% (Round 2, 2002) to 57% (Round 4, 2008).
However, that has significantly dropped, with only 23% now saying Ghana is a “full democracy” as of the most recent survey (Round 10, 2024).
Third, is our attitude towards military rule. In the maiden round of the survey (1999), 71% of Ghanaians expressed strong disapproval of military rule. This began to steadily decline.
Between Round 1 (1999) and Round 4 (2008), the level of strong disapproval dropped by ten percentage points.
Since then, strong disapproval of military rule has dropped to 45% (Round 10, 2024).
Fourth, is the extent to which Ghanaians feel they are enjoying the democratic dividend of free speech.
In Round 4 (2008), 78% of Ghanaians said they were “completely free” to say what they think.
As of Round 10 (2024), this had significantly dropped to 57%, a worrying sign for one of the basic democratic freedoms.
Fifth, is the view of political parties being divisive.
In Round 2 (2002), 38% agreed that “political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Ghana.”
This declined to 18% in Round 5 (2012).
However, since then, this has increased to 29% (Round 10, 2024).
This is worrying, given the critical role that political parties play in our democracy.
Sixth, trust in the courts has seen a steady decline.
In Round 1 (1999), 23% of Ghanaians expressed “a lot” of trust in the courts.
This declined to 10% (Round 2, 2002) before significantly improving to 35% (Round 3, 2005).
Since then, the percentage of Ghanaians expressing “a lot” of trust in the courts has declined to an extremely low level of 13% (Round 10, 2024).
The courts play an important role as independent arbiters in our democracy.
If citizens do not trust them, it raises the question of whether they will resort to extrajudicial methods to seek redress for their grievance.
Seventh, is the trust in opposition political parties.
In Round 3 (2005), only 26% of Ghanaians expressed “a lot” of trust in opposition political parties.
Already low, this has declined to only 13% (Round 10, 2024).
Opposition political parties serve as an important guardrail of democracy, especially in holding ruling parties accountable.
Low trust in them makes it difficult for Ghanaians to embrace them as voices of accountability.
Eighth, is our support for democracy. Granted support for democracy remains high at 73% (Round 10, 2024).
However, there are two important shifts to take note off – a) the percentage of Ghanaians who say “democracy is preferable to any other form of government” dropped from 81% (2017) to 73% (2024); and b) the percentage of Ghanaians who say “sometimes, a non-democratic form of government is preferable” has doubled from 9% (Round 1, 1999) to 18% (Round 10, 2024).
Way forward
While these shifts are very concerning, I take consolation in the fact that support for democracy remains high (73%) as previously noted.
In addition, Ghanaians hold positive democratic values such as the use of elections to select leaders, support for parliamentary oversight, judicial constraints on the presidency, and term limits.
These can serve as solid building blocks to address the concerning shifts noted above.
The writer is the Project Director, Democracy Project.
Source:
www.graphic.com.gh