State funding of parties: Political scientist proposes hybrid model

A political scientist, Dr Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari, has proposed a ‘hybrid financing model’ for the state to support political parties in the country.

The hybrid financing model, he said, should combine limited direct subsidies, indirect support mechanisms, and stringent oversight by institutions such as the Electoral Commission (EC), Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), and the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to offer the most viable political parties’ funding pathway.

“In this hybrid financing model, limited direct subsidies refer to modest, conditional state funding allocated to political parties based on clear eligibility criteria such as electoral performance or parliamentary representation, and strictly earmarked for democratic functions such as policy development, voter education, and administrative strengthening rather than patronage,” he stated.

State funding

Contributing to the debate on state funding of political parties, Dr Bukari said those funds should be intentionally capped to prevent overdependence on the state, and should be subjected to rigorous monitoring and sanctions.

He said complementarily, indirect support mechanisms in the proposed state financing framework encompass non-monetary or cost-reducing interventions such as equitable access to state media, tax incentives for small political donations, provision of public venues and security for campaigns, and capacity-building support, that lower the financial barriers to political participation while minimising the risks of fund misappropriation, thereby collectively fostering a more transparent, competitive, and programmatic party system without encouraging fiscal excess or political dependency.

“But we should also remember that the democratic dividends of state financing will depend less on the availability of public resources than on the credibility of regulatory institutions and the enforcement of compliance norms in our public administration and political systems,” he stated. 

Reform

Dr Bukari, who is also the Head of Department of Political Science, University for Development Studies, explained that from a political economy and institutionalism perspective, state financing of political parties in Ghana would represent a transformative reform within the broader architecture of economic and political governance, albeit one whose outcomes were contingent upon the design of regulatory frameworks and enforcement mechanisms.

“At its core, public funding has the capacity to recalibrate the incentive structure underpinning political party behaviour.

It reduces reliance on private financiers, often embedded within contractor networks and the patronage-driven political system we operate in Ghana,” he stated. 

He noted that state funding would attenuate the logic of clientelism and rent-seeking political behaviour that frequently culminate in comprador political capture in the country.

Dr Bukari stressed that transparent public subventions could facilitate a shift from transactional to programmatic politics, particularly by curbing the monetisation of electoral competition that characterised the intra-party selection processes in the country under the Fourth Republican democratic dispensation.

“Nonetheless, in the absence of robust accountability institutions, including stringent auditing and disclosure regimes, public financing risks functioning as a complementary rather than a substitutive revenue stream for illicit political funding,” he stated.

Hybrid democracy

Dr Bukari said state support might contribute to the institutionalisation of political parties, a critical deficit in many hybrid democracies such as Ghana.

He said political parties under the Fourth Republican constitutional democracy had exhibited weak organisational depth and a pronounced dependence on ‘charismatic leadership.’

“Targeted public investment in policy research, cadre training, and organisational development akin to the roles played by entities such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung can enhance internal cohesion, ideological clarity, and procedural discipline,” he noted.

“Arguably, in distributive terms, public financing may mitigate asymmetries in political competition by lowering entry barriers and reducing incumbency advantages.

However, funding formulas predicated exclusively on prior electoral performance risk reinforcing party system closure and oligopolistic tendencies in the political electoral market in Ghana,” he pointed out.

Dr Bukari, however, noted that the critique that public funding might bureaucratise political parties and transform them into employment-generating entities was not unfounded.

“This necessitates a conditional and earmarked funding model, in which disbursements are tied to specific democratic functions rather than recurrent expenditures such as salaries,” he stressed.