The legal bridge connecting the courtrooms of Accra to the federal benches of the United States is built on aging timber. At its core is a 1931 treaty, signed in a colonial era between the United States and Great Britain, which Ghana inherited upon independence.
While the Ghanaian Supreme Court recently affirmed in The Republic v. Kayode & 3 Ors [2024] Ghasc 38 that this treaty remains part of our existing law under Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution, the practical application of this document has become a lightning rod for public frustration.
As we move through 2026, a glaring disparity has emerged: Ghana is fast-tracking its citizens to American soil, while the U.S. remains a slow-moving fortress when the request is reversed.
The 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Great Britain was drafted in a world of steamships, telegrams, and paper ledgers. Its language fiercely reflects this Victorian-era hangover, diligently listing extraditable offences such as “counterfeiting or altering money,” “forgery,” “embezzlement,” and “obtaining money or valuable securities by false pretences.”
While it relies heavily on the “dual criminality” doctrine- mandating that an act must be punishable by more than one year of imprisonment in both jurisdictions- this colonial relic was never designed to travel across the borderless, immediate complexities of 21st-century transnational crime.
Applying a 95-year-old diplomatic document to modern digital crimes requires a breathtaking degree of judicial and legal gymnastics. We are essentially using a manual for a bicycle to steer a jet. In fact, when the United States Department of Justice files an extradition request for a Ghanaian citizen implicated in a Business Email Compromise (BEC) scheme or cryptocurrency laundering, prosecutors and magistrates are forced into a legal fiction. They must stretch the 1931 definition of “forgery” or “false pretences” to cover spoofed IP addresses, manipulated algorithmic smart contracts, and blockchain transaction hashes.
For instance, in the extradition proceedings involving Abiola Ayorinde Kayode (ABK) and his co-conspirators, the U.S. indictment detailed a complex, loosely organized cyber-network that defrauded American companies of over $6 million, laundering the illicit funds through banks in China and the United Arab Emirates.
To facilitate this extradition under Ghana’s Extradition Act, 1960 (Act 22) and the 1931 Treaty, the Ghanaian District Magistrate had to legally equate the deployment of a malicious phishing script across international servers to the physical handing over of a forged paper cheque in a 1930s bank lobby.
This application is not just intellectually inaccurate; it introduces severe judicial risks. When terms are stretched beyond their statutory intent, the principle of legal certainty- a cornerstone of criminal justice- is dangerously eroded.
Again, the 1931 Treaty is entirely silent on the realities of digital forensics and data privacy. Modern cyber-prosecutions rely on gigabytes of intercepted metadata, encrypted hard drives, and cross-border data sharing. Yet, the treaty provides absolutely no procedural safeguards, evidentiary standards, or data privacy protocols for handling such digital intelligence.
There are no stipulations on how electronic evidence should be authenticated, nor are there protections against unlawful digital surveillance by foreign entities. Consequently, Ghanaian citizens extradited under this framework are stripped of modern data privacy protections, subjected to evidentiary transfers that would otherwise require rigorous scrutiny under contemporary mutual legal assistance treaties.
Because the treaty is so glaringly deficient in modern procedural safeguards, the entire framework is held together by the geopolitical “good faith” of the participating nations. Unfortunately, in the arena of international law, “good faith” is heavily dictated by power dynamics, and the current relationship feels entirely like a one-way street.
The imbalance is staggering and historically documented: since 1935, over one hundred Ghanaians have been extradited to the United States, with at least nine citizens surrendered in a single year recently for cybercrime allegations. In that same ninety-year period, the United States has extradited exactly zero Americans to Ghana.
In December 2025, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Rolf Olson celebrated a “major milestone”: the extradition of nine Ghanaians to the U.S. in a single year. These individuals, accused of sophisticated financial fraud and online impersonation, were moved with remarkable efficiency.
And the Ghanaian government- specifically the Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s office- has been praised by Washington for its “exceptional cooperation.”
However, this efficiency has not been reciprocated. The case of former Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta has become a symbol of this imbalance. Arrested in January 2026 by ICE for a visa overstay, Ofori-Atta remains in the Caroline Detention Facility in Virginia.
Despite a formal extradition request from Ghana- demanding he return to answer for 78 counts of alleged corruption and financial loss to the state involving the GH₵1.4 billion SML contract and the National Cathedral project in late 2025-the process has stalled.
His legal team is skillfully using the U.S. judicial system to argue that he faces a “political witch hunt,” effectively turning a bilateral legal obligation into a protracted political debate.
The removal of the INTERPOL Red Notice against him in February 2026- on the grounds of non-compliance- has only emboldened his defense, even though it should not legally bar the bilateral treaty process. To the average Ghanaian, it looks as though the U.S. is “playing smart,” benefiting from Ghana’s swift law enforcement while hiding behind its own procedural complexity to protect a high-profile figure.
Britain recognized the obsolescence of this colonial agreement decades ago, scrapping the 1931 treaty in the early 1970s to negotiate a modern, symmetrical framework with the United States. Ghana, however, remains tethered to a legal ghost.
A system that deems Ghana’s security and judicial apparatus lawful enough to swiftly surrender its own citizens, but not lawful enough to reclaim a fugitive politician, is not a partnership. It is a stark geopolitical subordination dressed up in the robes of international law.
There is therefore a growing, palpable anger on the streets of Accra. If Ghana can hand over nine of its own for cybercrimes within months, why has the U.S. spent nearly half a year “considering” the return of a man central to Ghana’s own financial accountability? This perception of unfairness is dangerous. It suggests that the U.S. views Ghana as a junior partner- a source of suspects rather than a sovereign equal.
When our security agencies rush to satisfy American requests, they risk appearing more loyal to Washington than to the principle of reciprocity. If the 1931 treaty is to remain valid, it must work both ways. Otherwise, it isn’t a treaty; it’s a tool of legal hegemony.
It is therefore okay to say that the 1931 treaty is outmoded and unfit for purpose. We need a new, modern bilateral agreement that specifically addresses cyber-offenses and sets strict timelines for both parties. More importantly, the U.S. must demonstrate that its commitment to the “rule of law” applies even when the suspect is a former high-ranking official.
Until there is a visible, fair, and reciprocal gesture from the United States regarding Ken Ofori-Atta, Ghana should pause further extraditions. Sovereignty is not a gift to be traded away; it is a right to be defended. If the U.S. wants our continued “exceptional cooperation,” they must prove that the road to justice leads both ways.
The author is a Legal Activist
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Source: www.myjoyonline.com