The ruling of Mr Justice John Eugene Nyante Nyadu of the High Court, Accra, (General Jurisdiction 10) delivered on April 15 2026 pursuant to an application for the prerogative writ of quo warranto against the exercise of the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial powers under Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) was made in violation of the power conferred upon the High Court on orders obtainable by judicial review under Order 55 Rule 1(a) and (b), and Rule 2 (1) (b) of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2004 (C. I. 47) and is therefore void ab initio.
It is amazing that without reading the ruling of the High Court and evaluating it against its powers to grant an application for quo warranto which is also known as an injunction in the nature of quo warranto, the public is being convinced by various interlocutors that the decision of the Court declaring and ordering that the OSP cannot prosecute corruption and corruption-related offences because of Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution is a proper decision to have been made upon the facts of the case and the law as enabled under Order 55 of C. I. 47 referred to above.
The supporters of the ruling of the High Court in favour of the applicant against the respondent OSP do not even appear to have read the originating notice of motion commencing the application for quo warranto and to have asked themselves the question whether the originating notice of motion was competent to commence an action for quo warranto by disclosing both a capacity and a cause of action in the applicant against the Respondent.
The Applicant’s application which purported to originate the action never stated that the Respondent was a public officer who had usurped the powers of the Attorney-General under Article 88 of the Constitution to prosecute the Applicant for any offence and should therefore as the respondent be restrained from acting in any public office in which that person is not entitled to act – (See Order 55 Rule 2 (b)).
It is obvious from the foregoing that the OSP as a juridical person cannot act in any public office as a prosecutor in which only a natural person is entitled to act. This is the reason why a Special Prosecutor is nominated by the Attorney-General and appointed under Section 13, and given the functions under Section 14 (2) of Act 959 which states that “the Special Prosecutor shall have full authority and control over the investigation, initiation and conduct of proceedings under subsection (1) of section 3.”
Consequently, it is only the Special Prosecutor or authorised officers acting under him who can be restrained in an application for quo warranto under Order 55 of C. I. 47 and not the OSP.
Any application for quo warranto is one in the nature of a request for “an order restraining a person from acting in any public office in which that person is not entitled to act” and cannot be sought by just any citizen of Ghana from the High Court.
The applicant seeking it must demonstrate in his originating application that his rights have been or are likely to be contravened in relation to him personally – (See for example Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution and C. I 47 on capacity to commence actions in the High Court generally).
Without the originating application disclosing the justifiable capacity in which the Applicant brought the application for quo warranto to the High Court, the Court will lack the jurisdiction to entertain the action. Indeed, Order 55 Rule 5 of C. I. 47 dealing with “Notice of application’ states inter alia in Rule 5 (4) that: (4) “An applicant shall not rely on any ground at the hearing not set out in the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application”.
This is why it was surprising that the learned High Court Judge stated in his ruling that: “The Applicant is facing prosecution by the respondent in the High Court differently constituted” when the applicant’s affidavit
merely stated his capacity and locus standi as: “(2) That I am a citizen of Ghana and the matters I depose to are within my knowledge …” Nowhere in the 13-paragraph affidavit did the applicant state that he “is facing prosecution by the respondent in the High Court differently constituted.”
It is important to keep in mind always that its trite learning that any originating process filed in any court of law by a party which is incompetent to commence the action is not curable by statements made in any processes filed by the adversary in answer to or opposition to the action.
The discourse that follows examines and analyses in detail the competence of the Applicant’s application for quo warranto to originate the action before the High Court under Order 55 of C. I. 47 and the erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court leading to the ruling it delivered on April 15 2026.
SUMMATION OF THE ACTION AND THE RULING OF THE COURT
I have carefully read the application for quo warranto filed by one Peter Archibold Hyde as Applicant against the OSP as the Respondent, the Respondent’s affidavit in opposition to the application, a supplementary affidavit purportedly filed by the Applicant without leave of the Court, and the Statement of Case of the Respondent, all filed in the High Court, General Jurisdiction 10 and the twenty-six-page ruling by the Court delivered on April 15 2026.
I have come to the considered conclusion that the originating notice of motion (the application for quo warranto) before the High Court which purported to begin the action did not disclose any locus standi and/or capacity in the Applicant against the Respondent to have grounded jurisdiction in the High Court to have entertained the application under Order 55 Rule 1(a) and (b), and Rule 2 (1) (b) of C. I. 47.
Secondly, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction (assuming it had any) in purporting to apply the provisions of Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution to Section 4 (2) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) when in evaluating the substantive contentions between the parties it palpably indulged in the interpretation of the Constitution to arrive at its decision in violation of Articles 2 and 130 thereof.
Thirdly, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered “the Attorney-General to take over all prosecutions currently being handled by the Respondent (OSP) in the various courts pending the submission of its application to the Attorney-General for the grant of authorisation….” The High Court has no jurisdiction to make such an order under Order 55 of C. I 47 on an application for quo warranto.
Fourthly and finally, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering and declaring any conviction secured by the Respondent as a result of the purported exercise of prosecutorial power void, and the trial of the persons convicted to be commenced de novo by the Attorney General. Again, the High Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order under Order 55 of C. I 47 on an application for quo warranto.
Any impartial interlocutor for knowledge striving for objectivity in the examination and analysis of the on-going discourse on the constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) to enable the public to make informed decisions, ought first to read the source materials before forming opinions for public consumption.
The mainstream media and social media immediately became awash with applause and condemnation when the High Court, Accra, (General Jurisdiction 10) presided over by Mr Justice John Eugene Nyante Nyadu on 15 April 2026 delivered the ruling of the Court in the application for the supervisory relief of quo warranto filed by one Peter Archibold Hyde (the Applicant) against the OSP deciding under Article 88 of the Constitution that:
”The purported exercise of prosecutorial power by the Respondent without lawful authorization is unlawful.” The High Court made the following order which I quote in extenso to emphasise the excess of jurisdiction as conferred on it under Order 55 of C. I. 47: “ Since by clause (3) of Article 88 of the Constitution the Attorney-General is responsible for the initiation and conduct of prosecutions of all criminal offences in Ghana, I hereby order the Attorney-General to take over all prosecutions currently being handled by the respondent (office of the special Prosecutor) in the various courts pending the submission of its application to the Attorney-General for the grant of authorisation to its officers by way of an Executive Instrument to enable them prosecute criminal offence. (Emphasis supplied).
The Court further made the following consequential order also without jurisdiction to do so: “Consequently, any conviction if any, secured by the respondent as a result of the purported exercise of prosecutorial power is hereby declared void, and I order the trial of the persons convicted to be commenced de novo by the Attorney-General pending the respondent applying to the Attorney-General for its officers to be authorised to conduct criminal prosecutions and the issue of the necessary Executive Instrument in that regard.” (Emphasis supplied).
There is an important context to a proper appreciation of the application for quo warranto that gave rise to the ruling under examination. On 8 December 2025 one Noah Adamtey had filed an action against the Attorney-General in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Act 959. Noah Adamtey’s action had assumed notoriety as a matter of public interest such that no reasonable person living in Ghana could claim ignorance of it.
The Applicant filed his application for quo warranto in the High Court on January 30, 2026. The learned trial High Court Judge knew of the pendency of Mr Adamtey’s suit in the Supreme Court.
From the learned Judge’s ruling on the application for quo warranto, he narrates that on December 8, 2025 (the same day the action was filed in the Supreme Court) the Applicant also filed a motion on notice in the High Court, Accra, (Criminal Division) seeking an order directing the OSP to furnish the criminal court with its warrant of authority from the Attorney-General authorising its officers to prosecute in the name of the Republic.
The OSP in its affidavit in opposition filed on 16 December 2025 relied on what it described as the “presumption of regularity” in respect of its prosecutorial acts. In view of the narrative of the learned trial High Court Judge in his ruling he was duty-bound to find out whether or not the earlier application in the High Court, Accra, (Criminal Division) filed on December 8 2025 was still pending or how the High Court Criminal Division had ruled on the earlier application which was similar to the one filed in High Court, Accra, (General Jurisdiction 10) for almost the same relief.
If the prior application in the High Court Criminal Division was still pending, then the learned trial Judge in the High Court General Jurisdiction 10 must have known that he had no jurisdiction to concurrently entertain the same or similar application as was filed on January 30, 2026. As it turned out, the High Court, Accra, (Criminal Division) before which the case of Republic v Issah Seidu & 3 Others in which Peter Archibold Hyde had made the earlier application as the 4th Accused person had been adjourned to April 15 2026 for a ruling after ordering that the other accused be served with the application.
On the return date, Mrs Justice Ruby Aryeetey sitting in the Criminal Division of the same High Court dismissed the application of December 8, 2025, and adjourned the substantive criminal trial to abide the decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Act 959 in accordance with judicial
self-restraint in such matter pending before a Higher Court.
On the same day Mr Justice John Nyadu with notice of the pendency of the substantive constitutional action before the Supreme Court decide to deliver a ruling in the incompetent quo warranto application for which he had no jurisdiction.
THE COMPETENCE OF THE ORIGINATING APPLICATION
The application in the nature of an originating notice of motion stating the grounds of the application and an accompanying affidavit was filed in the High Court on January 30, 2026. The originating notice of motion endorsed with the reliefs sought and grounds on which the application was made nowhere stated that the applicant is a person being investigated for any corruption and corruption-related offences or prosecuted by the OSP as the Respondent in any court.
The supporting affidavit deposed to by the Applicant, Peter Archibold Hyde, states the only capacity in which he brings the action and deposes to the affidavit in paragraph 2 of the affidavit as follows: “That I am a citizen of Ghana and competent to depose to this affidavit in support of the application”.
Paragraphs 3 to 13 of the supporting affidavit then make statements of law instead of fact in relation to the respondent and the prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General. The only circumstance under the 1992 Constitution in which citizenship alone without a demonstration of the existence of a dispute between the litigating parties grants the initiating party capacity and confers a cause of action to bring an action in the courts is provided for under Articles 2 and 130 of the 1992 Constitution for interpretation and enforcement of a provision of the Constitution by the Supreme Court.
The original jurisdiction of the High Court is premised on the existence of a real dispute or controversy between the initiator of the action and his adversary. Consequently, when a writ and/or a statement of claim does not disclose the capacity vested in the initiator of the action and a cause of action premised on the rules of the court to bring an action before the High Court, the court will lack jurisdiction to hear the action ab initio.
For instance, under Article 33 of the Constitution which deals with the “Protection of Rights by the High Court” it is only where a person alleges that a provision of the Constitution has been or is likely to be contravened against in relation to him that such a person may apply to the High Court for redress.
The High Court in such circumstances may issue such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of the rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.
The Supreme Court has decided in a number of cases the circumstances under which citizenship confers capacity on a person to start an action in the Supreme Court to ventilate allegations of breaches of human rights and freedoms without having a personal or special interest in the case.
An application to the High Court for judicial review by any citizen without disclosing the existence of a cause of action between him and the respondent does not confer upon the High Court jurisdiction to hear the action: to do so will be tantamount to acting without jurisdiction by the High Court.
Any High Court which has no jurisdiction to hear a quo warranto application in such a case in the first instance cannot use admissions or averments made by the respondent in the respondent’s affidavit in opposition to the incompetent application to cure any defects in the originating application as the learned High Court Judge did by introducing the fact that the Applicant was being prosecuted by the respondent in his ruling as though the Applicant deposed to those facts in his supporting affidavit to his application.
Order 55 Rule 5 (4) puts this matter beyond doubt when it states that: “(4) An applicant shall not rely on any ground at the hearing not set out in the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application.” Those who have worked with me in the Attorney-General’s Department for more than a decade, and as the first Special Prosecutor know that in such important cases affecting the institution I served, I was always in command of the proceedings in raising all objections to the competence of the action.
Nothing would have been filed in any action in the name of the institution without my personal clearance and in such cases, I led my troops into battle from the front and not in the shadows. I do not cede command and control to lowly officers as the Special Prosecutor did in such a serious case before the High Court which has given rise to the mess of floppy legal representation resulting in the unlawful assumption of jurisdiction and the fundamentally erroneous ruling given by the Court against the OSP.
The Courts are so inundated with cases that the success of most actions depend on how good the lawyers handling them are. Why did the Special Prosecutor or his deputy instruct the prosecutor (who was delegated to represent the respondent) to file an affidavit in opposition to the incompetent action instead of raising preliminary objection to the locus standi of the Applicant and his lack of a justiciable cause of action against the respondent?
The law may be said to be in the bosom of the judge but everybody knows that judges need help from good lawyers to see the issues in controversy and the limits of their jurisdiction clearly. The learned High Court Judge would have found it difficult to rush the hearing of the application as he did if a preliminary objection had been filed to the competence of the action based on the grounds I have canvassed hereinbefore.
The Applicant would have had to withdraw his application and come again to the Court with a competent action or if the court had ruled against the objection, an appeal or an application for certiorari would have been lodged in the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court as the case may be.
The incompetence of the Special Prosecutor and his office is the only reason for the OSP filing an affidavit in opposition to the equally incompetent action of the Applicant raising issues of limitation for the action which had not accrued before the court because there was no competent action pending before it.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
I have contended that assuming the High Court had original jurisdiction to entertain the Applicant’s action against the Respondent, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in purporting to apply the provisions of Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution to Section 4 (2) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) when in evaluating the substantial contentions between the parties it palpably indulged in the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution to arrive at its decision in violation of Articles 2 and 130 thereof which apportion the interpretative and enforcement jurisdiction of the Constitution to only the Supreme Court.
After stating that: “It is the case of the applicant that clause 4 of Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution vests the prosecutorial power for the prosecution of all criminal offences in the Attorney-General who may exercise that power personally or through lawful delegation” the learned Judge then sets out portions of the applicant’s supporting affidavit paragraphs 5 to 8 to support the prayer of the applicant.
The Court indicated that the Respondent raised preliminary objection to its jurisdiction on grounds of limitation of time for the applicant to commence the action for quo warranto and the fundamental jurisdictional challenge that the application raises a question of interpretation of Article 88 of the Constitution vis-a-vis Section 4 (2) of Act 959 which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine.
The High Court Judge stated that no issue of constitutional interpretation arose in the application before him. Consequently, the Court proceeded to evaluate the substantive contentions between the parties. But an examination and analysis of the learned Judge’s evaluation of the contentions between the parties leaves one in no doubt that the Court was engaged in the interpretation of the meaning and scope of Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution and Section 4 (2) of Act 959.
The learned Judge went to the extent of determining whether Section 4 (2) could qualify as an amendment of Article 88 (4) of the 1992 Constitution under Articles 289 and 290 (1) (f), (2) to (6) thereof dealing with the amendment of the entrenched provisions of Article 88. In order to apply the provisions of Article 88 of the Constitution to Section 4 (2) of Act 959, the learned Judge further engaged in interpreting the meaning and effect of Article 106 to 108 on the legislative powers of Parliament.
The learned Judge after stating that in other jurisdictions the means of establishing an independent anti-corruption agency was to confer the powers and independence by means of Constitutional amendment, threw away his duty of adjudication to dabble in politics when he stated at pages 21 and 22 that:
“This is not the situation in Ghana because Article 88 of the Constitution is entrenched yet because there was the need to meet a campaign promise, some legislative gymnastics and re engineering had to be done to see it brought to light without surmounting the glaring effect of Article 88 of the Constitution on the decision taken.” Be that as it may, it is obvious from the evaluation of the substantive contentions between the parties that the learned Judge usurped the original and exclusive jurisdiction apportioned to the Supreme Court under Articles 2 and 130 in interpreting provisions of the Constitution vis a-vis Section 4 (2) of Act 959.
The whole of his ruling in the application for quo warranto based on such usurpation of the powers of the Supreme Court renders his ruling void, null, and without effect. But the OSP has to vacate that ruling by seeking judicial review before the Supreme Court for the ruling to be brought up to the Supreme Court and quashed.
LACK OF JURISDICTION UNDER ORDER 55 TO ORDER THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND NULLIFY CONVICTIONS
Apart from usurping the original exclusive interpretative and enforcement powers of the Supreme Court, the learned High Court Judge further exceeded his jurisdiction under Order 55 of C. I. 47 when he ordered “the Attorney-General to take over all prosecutions currently being handled by the respondent (Office of the Special Prosecutor) in the various courts pending the submission of its application to the Attorney-General for the grant of authorisation…..” The learned High Court Judge knew or ought to have known that the decisions of his court do not bind other High Court Judges or the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. Indeed, the learned Judge stated in his ruling that:
“The Applicant is facing prosecution by the respondent in the High Court differently constituted.” The High Court further exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering and declaring any conviction secured by the respondent as a result of the purported exercise of prosecutorial power void, and the trial of the persons convicted to be commenced de novo by the Attorney-General.
The orders obtainable by an applicant from the High Court on the hearing of an application for judicial review are stated in Order 55 Rule 2 (1), inter alia, as: (a) an order for prohibition, certiorari or mandamus; (b) an order restraining a person from acting in any public office in which that person is not entitled to act; (c) any other injunction; (d) declaration; (e) payment of damages.
It is important to understand that no mention is made of relief of quo warranto in Order 55 Rule 2 (1) (a) because Rule 2 (1) (b) is the order made in applications for quo warranto which is also known as an injunction in the nature of quo warranto.
The application before the High Court was one for quo warranto and it is evident from Order 55 Rule 2 (1) (a) and (b) that in the case of quo warranto the order the Court can make is as stated therein: “(b) an order restraining a person from acting in any public office in which that person is not entitled to act; (c ) any other injunction; (d) declaration; (e) payment of damages” Indeed the prerogative writ of quo warranto used to be known as an injunction in the nature of quo warranto which requires the respondent to appear before the High Court and state why he should not be restrained from acting in any public office in which that person is not entitled to act.
In granting an injunction or making a declaration under paragraphs (c ) or (d) of Order 55 Rule 2 (2) of C. I. 47 the Court shall have regards to (a) the matter in respect of which relief may be granted by way of prohibition, certiorari or mandamus; (b) the nature of the persons against whom relief may be granted by way of the order; and (c ) whether in all the circumstances of the particular case it would be just and convenient to grant an injunction or make a declaration on the application for judicial review.
It should be obvious from the foregoing that the High Court did not have jurisdiction under Order 55 of C. I. 47 in the application for quo warranto to purport to “order the Attorney General to take over all prosecutions currently being handled by the respondent (OSP) in the various courts pending the submission of its application to the Attorney-General for the grant of authorisation…..” or to order and declare any conviction secured by the respondent as a result of the purported exercise of prosecutorial power void, and the trial of the persons convicted to be commenced de novo by the Attorney-General”
PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS AFFECTING PENDING ACTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
It is a matter of notorious public knowledge that the Supreme Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to make a conclusive and final decision on the constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) is seized with an action commenced before it by one Noah Adamtey on 8 December 2025 against the Attorney-General representing the Republic of Ghana. The Attorney-General delayed this action by filing its Statement of the Defendant’s Case for the expeditious disposal of such an important case in the interest of the future of the fight against corruption.
It only applied for leave for extension of time to file its defence on 8 April 2026 which was granted by the Supreme Court on April 16 2026. For some reason the High Court dealing with the incompetent application for quo warranto the subject of our present discourse failed or refused to exercise its discretion at the hearing to order that notice of the application be served on the Attorney-General as a person not named as a party but who was directly affected by the application against another state institution under Order 55 Rule 5(2) of C. I. 47.
Nonetheless, We-the-People are entitled to the expectation that the Attorney-General as the principal legal adviser to the Government and entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under Article 88 (3), (4) and (5) of the Constitution will act in accordance with the taught tradition of the common law by refraining from making any triumphant comments on the ruling by the High Court granting the application of quo warranto against the OSP in view of the substantive case pending before the Supreme Court in which the Attorney-General, representing the interest of the Republic, is the Defendant.
Unfortunately, immediately Mr Justice Nyadu’s Court delivered what I have described herein as a void decision on April 15 2026, the Deputy Attorney-General threw all caution, legal ethics, and decorum to the wind and made prejudicial statements to the media which had the effect of interfering with the substantive writ filed by Noah Adamtey in which the Deputy Attorney-General was to move the Supreme Court the next day for leave to file the Defendant’s Statement of Case.
The Deputy Attorney-General without even reading the originating application and evaluating it as I have done hereinbefore stated conclusively that the only way the OSP can have independent prosecutorial power is when there is a constitutional amendment to Article 88 of the Constitution.
But as the person who filed the application for leave for extension of time to file the Defendant’s Statement of Case, the Deputy Attorney-General knew that the provision of Article 88 was the subject matter of the substantive action before the Supreme Court on whether or not Act 959 is ultra vires the provisions of Article 88.
The Supreme Court granted the Attorney-General leave to file the Statement of the Defendant’s Case exhibited to the application for leave and the Defendant cannot change the content of his defence without a further leave from the Supreme Court. Unless the Attorney-General already knows the decision of the Supreme Court in the substantive suit, it is patently prejudicial of the expected decision of the Court for the Defendant to state categorically that the only way the OSP can have independent prosecutorial power is when there is a constitutional amendment to Article 88 of the Constitution.
I have stated in an earlier discourse published in the media that in a similar situation in the United States of America where the constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act was challenged, the US Supreme Court upheld the independence of the independent counsel provisions of the Act despite the general prosecutorial authority of the US Attorney-General. Despite the pendency of the action before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Act 959, the Attorney-General is goading the OSP to apply to him for authority to prosecute cases and that he will grant the authority.
It is unethical for the Attorney-General who represents the public interest of the Republic of Ghana as distinct from any particular government to try to pre-empt an interpretative and enforcement decision of the Supreme Court pursuant to Articles 2 and 130 of the Constitution by asking the OSP to apply for authority to prosecute and thereby render the action before the Supreme Court moot.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) was enacted to ensure the independence of the Special Prosecutor in the exercise of his functions under the Act. Applying for an authority from the Attorney-General to prosecute would mean that the Special Prosecutor will be subject to the direction and control of the Attorney-General which will defeat the rational for setting up the OSP.
The agency created by Act 959 will automatically cease to be an Office of the Special Prosecutor as there will be no difference between the prosecutorial powers granted to the Ghana Police Service or the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) or other prosecutorial agency.
The action before the Supreme Court for the interpretation and enforcement of Act 959 vis-a vis Article 58, 76, 78 and 88 of the Constitution provide the Court the opportunity to consider the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 13 (3), (4) and (5), and 14 of Act 959 to determine whether Act 959 is unconstitutional.
The fact that the Attorney-General’s Defence has unethically refused to put before the Supreme Court all the legal perspectives for and against the constitutionality of an independent Special Prosecutor does not mean that the Supreme Court is bound by the perspective contained in the Attorney-General’s partisan Defence.
I have canvassed in a previous discourse published in the media that Anti-Corruption Civil Society Organizations who believe in fighting corruption through the instrumentality of an independent OSP should apply to the Supreme Court for leave to join the action as Interested Parties and put before the Court the perspective which the Attorney-General has suppressed or omitted from his Statement of the Defendant’s Case.
In the interim, it behoves the Special Prosecutor to apply to the Supreme Court soonest for judicial review in the nature of an application for certiorari to quash the ruling of the learned High Court Judge given without jurisdiction and for the usurpation of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
An application for stay of execution of the ruling of the High Court ought also to be made to the High Court pending the disposal of the application for judicial review to the Supreme Court. The advice that the Special Prosecutor should sit tight and receive the emoluments of the Office and not take any steps to overturn the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction in the application for quo warranto exemplifies the thinking of compradors who will milk the Ghanaian taxpayer for their foreign masters without compunction.
Once there exists a pending action filed on 8 December 2025 pursuant to Articles 2 and 130 of the Constitution by Noah Adamtey against the Attorney-General, I would when I was the Attorney-General have ignored the erroneous ruling of the High Court and concentrated my attention on assisting the Supreme Court to impartially determine with finality whether Act 959 is inconsistent with and in contravention of Article 88 of the Constitution.
The primary duty of any Attorney-General is to assist the administration of justice as an officer of the courts to do justice to all manner of persons without fear or favour, affection or ill will even when the heavens fall. As the Special Prosecutor, I would on my own have considered it to be in the interest of justice to seek long adjournments for cases pending before the criminal courts to abide the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Noah Adamtey v the Attorney-General instead of flexing muscles with the Attorney-General.
Hopefully, other High Courts before which corruption and corruption-related cases from the OSP are pending will exercise judicial self-restraint and respect for the Supreme Court and adjourn those cases to abide the decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Act 959 just as Mrs. Justice Ruby Aryeetey did not in the substantive case of the Republic v Issah Seidu & 4 Others on April 15 2026.
CONCLUSION
I have no doubt that anybody replicating the examination and analysis of the originating process for the application for quo warranto leading up to and including the ruling delivered by the learned trial High Court Judge, Mr. Justice John Eugene Nyante Nyadu, in the matter of an application for quo warranto by Peter Archibold Hyde in Suit No.: GJ/0369/2026 entitled Republic v The Office of the Special Prosecutor, High Court, Accra, 15 April 2026 (unreported) will come to the same conclusions I arrived at as demonstrated in this discourse hereinbefore.
The outcome of the examination and analysis arrived at in this discourse do not mean that I condone the persistent persecutorial and other unconstitutional conduct of the Special Prosecutor which has attracted the opprobrium of Ghanaians against the OSP expressed in the actions against it about which I have written severally.
Let every patriotic citizen exercise patience and abide the decision of the Supreme Court in the pending case of Adamtey v the Attorney-General on the constitutionality of OSP under Act 959.
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